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Purpose of Thesis: ! ~~. : 
This thesis explores the landmark 1966 Supreme Court 
decision, Miranda v. Arizona, in regards to social factors, 
political influences, civil liberties, and the 
administration of criminal justice. It gives an historical 
analysis of the case, from the civil rights ruling that 
sparked a public controversy, to the attempts of ambitious 
politicians who sought to overturn it. It also attempts 
to explain the actual effects of the Miranda decision; 
whether it has lived up to the fears of escalating crime 
rates, or whether it remains as a hallmark of the 
constitutional rights of all men and women. 
-
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Phoenix, Arizona. 11:15 P.M., March 2, 1963. Late that 
Saturday night an eighteen year old refreshment girl at a 
downtown theater rode the bus home after finishing work. While 
walking home from the bus stop she was grabbed, shoved into 
a car, and bound at the ankles where she was driven into the 
desert and raped by an unknown assailant. 
After running home hysterical and frightened, the young 
girl's sister telephoned the police, who were dispatched to 
her home. Officers Carroll Cooley and Wilfred Young arrived 
to question the woman, who described her attacker as a Mexican 
male, 27-28 years old, 5'11", 175 pounds, with a slender build 
and black, short, curly hair. She could not as clearly remember 
the car, but did recall it as an older model. 
One week later, the young woman's brother met her at the 
bus stop and while walking home they noticed an old model Packard 
driving along, which she thought looked similar to the car driven 
by her assailant. He wrote the license number down and gave 
it to the investigating officers. Officers Cooley and Young 
ran the plate through registrations and found a 1953 Packard 
registered to a young woman whom they discovered had a man living 
with her by the name of Ernest Miranda. 
The officers located Miranda and he was asked to go to 
the police station with them, although he was not told what 
it was about. Miranda said later, "I didn't know whether I 
had a choice"(Baker 12). He was then placed in a line-up for 
the young woman to identify her abductor. She was not able 
to positively identify Miranda as the man who had driven her 
-- into the desert. 
Officers Cooley and Young then took Miranda into an 
interrogation room, informed him that he had been identified 
by the woman, and proceeded to question him at lenghth about 
the rape. Miranda eventually confessed to the rape and the 
young girl was brought to the interrogation room for Miranda 
to identify, which he did. He then signed a written confession 
to the crime, and signed a statement that he was confessing 
voluntarily. 
At the trial, Maricopa County Deputy Prosecutor Laurence 
Turoff introduced into evidence only one exhibit on behalf of 
the state, the written confession of Ernest Miranda. Defense 
counsel Alvin Moore objected to the introduction of the 
confession as evidence, citing that Miranda was without an 
attorney at the time of signing the confession. He told the 
court, "We object because the Supreme Court of the United states 
says a man is entitled to an attorney at the time of his 
arrest"(Baker 23). Moore's objection was overruled, as was 
his reasoning that the confession of Ernest Miranda was not 
voluntarily obtained. Judge Yale McFate reasoned that "the 
fact that a defendant was under arrest at the time he made a 
confession, or that he was not at the time represented by 
counsel, or he was not told that any statement he might make 
could or would be used against him, in and of themselves, will 
not render such confession involuntary"(Baker 24). This 
reasoning held, as the jury found Miranda guilty of kidnapping 
and raping the young woman. 
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Miranda was sentenced to two concurrent terms of twenty 
to thirty years at the Arizona state Prison. Moore appealed, 
claiming that Miranda's constitutional rights had not been 
protected. He had not been warned that his confession could 
be used against him, and he was not made aware of his rights 
prior to signing the confession. He was not provided with an 
attorney at the time of his questioning. 
Little known to the participants at that time, the two 
hours in the interrogation room would have a substantial impact 
on the American public, politics, and the administration of 
criminal justice for years to come. The man, Ernest Miranda, 
was quickly forgotten, but his name became a calling card for 
the rights of individuals in criminal cases. Miranda, the 
Supreme Court decision, symbollized evrything that was good 
in the administration of criminal justice, and everything that 
was wrong with it. It showed the split between those who 
believed that the state's right to uphold justice was more 
important than the rights of criminals, and those who argued 
that the constitutional rights of all people are so sacred that 
even the rights of criminals could not be infringed upon on 
behalf of the best interests of the state. Miranda's case made 
crime a social and political issue that shook the very 
foundations of the criminal justice system and forced police 
and the courts to take another look at crime. Some hailed the 
landmark decision as a symbol of human rights, while others 
damned it as an invitation to criminal deviance and 
corruption(Baker 14). On either hand, Miranda stands as one 
-. 
of the most significant and far-reaching cases ever handed down 
by the Supreme Court. 
Ernest Miranda's case dealt with the admissability of 
confessions, whether they were obtained voluntarily, and the 
rights guaranteed to criminal suspects during a custodial 
interrogation. These concerns had long been overlooked or 
ignored in the administration and practices of the criminal 
justice system policy and procedures. A formal study conducted 
in 1931 (known as the Wickersham Commission) revealed widespread 
police brutality in dealing with criminal suspects. Especially 
violent were examples of police brutality while attempting to 
elicit confessions. The Commission listed examples of beatings, 
pistol whippings, strappings, and holding suspects' heads under 
water in order to elicit confessions(Baker 67). Despite the 
findings of the study, the United States Supreme Court remained 
reluctant to intervene in the decisions of the state courts, 
and would do so only in an extremely drastic emergency. 
The first case in which the Supreme Court intervened in 
the decision of a state court was Powell v Alabama (1932). 
The case involved nine young black men, known as the Scottsboro 
Boys, who were convicted of raping two white girls on a freight 
train during the summer of 1931. The boys were provided with 
less than adequate counsel, even though it was a capital case, 
and the trial itself was nothing more than a sham. The trial 
was dictated by an angry mob that had gathered in the 
courthouse(Baker 67). The boys were sentenced to death. In 
this case, the Supreme Court intervened and reversed the decision 
--
of the Alabama court, ordering new trials. This marked the 
first time that the Supreme Court had overturned the decision 
of a state court because the defendants had not had a fair trial. 
In 1936 the Supreme Court took another step in the direction 
of protecting individual rights. In their decision in Brown 
v Mississippi, they reversed a state court conviction because 
a coerced confession had been used to secure the convictions 
of three poor, illiterate black men. One of these men had been 
hung by a tree and whipped until he confessed. The other two 
were forced to strip and were beaten with a leather strap until 
confessing. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions on the 
basis that the defendants had been denied their constitutional 
right to due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In the unanimous decision, written by Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes, it was stated, "the rack and torture 
chamber may not be substitutes for the witness stand"(Malone 
375). 
Never before had the Supreme Court taken more measures to 
assure the rights of all individuals than during the era known 
as the Warren Court, named for its Chief Justice Earl Warren. 
At the time Ernest Miranda's case was being argued to the land's 
highest court, they were not at the heighth of public support 
or popularity. The Warren Court had been for years "upsetting 
long-established customs and altering long-established 
procedures, all in the name of upholding the constitutional 
rights of the individual"(Baker 27). Miranda was the latest 
,-- in a long line of cases heard by the court in the 1960's in 
which individual rights had been upheld over the claims of law 
enforcement. 
-
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In 1964 The Warren Court had ruled on a confession case 
called Escobedo v Illinois. The defendant, Danny Escobedo, 
was arrested by police as a suspect in a shooting and taken 
into custody. For three hours police questioned Escobedo about 
the crime. He repeatedly asked to see his lawyer, who was 
present in the staion house and was trying to see his client. 
Both were repeatedly refused. At no time was he informed of 
his constitutional right to remain silent. Escobedo eventually 
made an incriminating statement involving himself in the crime. 
This statement, or confession, was used to gain conviction for 
the state of Illinois. The Warren Court intervened, ruling 
that during a custodial interrogation a suspect has a right 
to "the Assistance of Counsel" as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. The accused, they ruled, must also be warned of 
his absolute constitutional right to remain silent(Baker 32). 
The Court's decision in Escobedo sent a message that the 
interrogation room was not beyond the reach of the United States 
Constitution. 
While an inmate at the Arizona State Prison, Ernest Miranda 
filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. His case had been appealed and his conviction 
upheld by the Arizona State Supreme Court. The writ of 
certiorari is the formal request to the court for a case to 
be heard. At the same time, Miranda's case caught the attention 
-of the American Civil Liberties Union and Robert Corcoran, who 
ran the Phoenix office. Miranda's attorney Alvin Moore indicated 
that he would be unable to take the case, so Corcoran was able 
to solicit the expertise of John Flynn, who in turn enlisted 
the help of John Frank, who was at the time one of Arizona's 
leading criminal atorneys. 
In preparing the case, it was agreed that Flynn was the 
better trial attorney and would handle the oral argument. Frank, 
along with some younger members of his law firm, would handle 
most of the legal work in preparing the brief, and his firm 
would cover the expenses(Baker 63). 
There was disagreement between the two lawyers over what 
strategy to take in arguing the case. Flynn felt that the case 
concerned the Fifth Amendment issue of self incrimination; 
however, he eventually agreed with Frank's reasoning that the 
case was more of a Sixth Amendment "Assistance of Counsel" issue. 
The two decided to take the case as a Sixth Amendment violation. 
In the brief the lawyers wrote, "The cause of due process is 
ill-served when a disturbed, little-educated indigent is 
sentenced to lenghty prison terms on the basis of a confession 
which he gave without first being advised of his right to 
counsel"(Baker 84). 
For Miranda's case to be heard by the Supreme Court, it 
had to satisfy certain criteria and a thorough review of the 
justices. For any case to be heard by the high court, it must 
raise a substantial federal or constitutional question that 
could not be resolved by any state law. Miranda's case satisfied 
the nesessary criteria and the judges decided his case was ripe 
for consideration. The timing of the case played a big role 
in the court's decision, as their recent ruling in Escobedo 
had been very broad and left a feeling that some matters of 
the confessions issue needed clarification. They saw Miranda 
as the avenue to resolve the matter. 
Monday, February 28, 1966. John Flynn began his oral 
argument that afternoon on case number 759, Ernesto A. Miranda, 
Petitioner, versus Arizona. During his description of the case, 
Flynn was interrupted by Justice Fortas who asked, "You said 
that Miranda was not told that he might remain silent. Did 
you say that"(Baker 137)? From that moment on, Flynn continued 
his argument with Fifth Amendment considerations, as he had 
thought, as well as Sixth Amendment. 
Gary Nelson, assistant attorney general in charge of appeals 
for the state of Arizona, began his first oral argument in front 
of the Supreme Court as soon as Flynn finished his. The state's 
presentation was based on the belief that the confesions question 
was strictly a Sixth Amendment issue. State's argument was 
that allowing counsel for the defense to enter the interrogation 
room would effectively cease interrogation. Throughout Nelson's 
presentation, the justices constantly attacked him on Fifth 
Amendment questions as related to Miranda's case, to which he 
had no sound legal or constitutional answers(Baker 138). 
Monday, June 13, 1966. Chief Justice Earl Warren read 
the landmark decision in the case Miranda v Arizona. For the 
~ 
first time since the ruling in Brown v Mississippi was handed 
down in 1936, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a 
state court because a confession was coerced. The decision 
was unprecedented, as it imposed specific rules on law 
enforcement officers and agencies regarding custodial 
interrogation and the admissibility of confessions. These rules 
were clearly defined in the decision: 
The prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial 
interrogation unless it can demonstrate the use 6f procedural 
safeguards to protect against self-incrimination. 
Prior to any questioning, the accused must be informed of his 
right to remain silent, that any statements made may be used 
as evidence against him, and that he has the right to an 
attorney. 
The defendant may waive these rights if said waiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. If he wishes to 
talk to an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. 
If he tells police he does not want to be interrogated, the 
police may not question him. 
The Supreme Court's decision applied to confessions taken 
while individuals were in custody only, which was the case with 
Ernesto Miranda. Under this decision, no incriminating 
statements which had come from a custodial interrogation would 
-be admissible at trial unless police had previously warned the 
defendant of his specific rights, and the defendant had knowingly 
and voluntarily waived these rights(Sheehan 299). Miranda's 
waiver, it was ruled, had not been freely or voluntarily given. 
His confession was thus ruled inadmissible, and the decision 
of the Arizona state Supreme Court was reversed. 
The decision that day had brought the constitutional 
safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the country's 
police stations and interrogation rooms. It stood as the high 
point of the Warren Court's dedication to the high ideals of 
civil liberties. It guaranteed the rights of all people, rich 
and poor alike, would be equally protected according to the 
law and the Constitution of the United States. However, there 
were many strong feelings that this time the court had gone 
too far ••• 
The reading of the decision in Miranda was only the 
beginning of a social, legal, and political debate over whether 
the Court had gone too far in protecting the rights of 
individuals. The Court had divided, with the four dissenting 
justices standing as an inspiration for the public upheaval 
over Miranda, and fueling the protests of politicians and the 
law enforcement community. The dissenters were extremely 
critical of Miranda, and their concerns left law enforcement 
officials fearful for the future. 
Police complained bitterly in protest. of the Miranda ruling, 
which they felt was far too heavy a restraint placed on them 
-by the court. The Boston Police Commissioner argued that, 
"Criminal trials will no longer be a search for truth, but for 
technical error"(Baker 176). Many police officers felt that 
criminals' rights were being protected at the expense of innocent 
victims and the public at large. They complained that the ruling 
actually protected the guilty, and claimed that voluntary 
confessions would be impossible to obtain. Police officers 
felt that the Court was going too far by looking over their 
shoulders and examining routine police procedures. 
Many police departments virtually ignored the Miranda 
rulings, maintaining a "business as usual" attitude in their 
daily workings. One anonymous police officer was quoted as 
saying, " ••• the Miranda decision ••• police have never cared 
about any of that. That's all bullshit. They testify however 
they want to. 
'Did you give him the Miranda warning?f 
'Yeah, sure I gave it to him.' Who's there to say he didn't 
give the prisoner the Miranda warning? The prisoner? That's 
a joke"(Mark Baker 318). 
There was also considerable confusion as to exactly what 
officers could do under Miranda, and to when and where it 
applied. Hardly anyone thoroughly understood the basic 
requirements. This confusion led to frustration and a feeling 
by the police that they had been betrayed by the Supreme Court. 
Attacks on the Warren Court by law enforcement officials were 
at an all time high. 
The dissenters of Miranda, the public controversy and 
--. 
upheaval, and repeated attacks on the Supreme Court as being 
"soft on criminals," pushed the issue of crime into the political 
limelight. Congress was quick to attack the Supreme Court, 
claiming that they possessed too much power. Legislation was 
drafted in attempt not only to nullify the Miranda decision, 
but to reduce the power of the Supreme Court as a branch of 
government. Congressmen and Senators were also quick in assuring 
their constituents that they were tough on crime and would not 
support Court decisions which, in their eyes, supported the 
rights of criminals. Constitutional amendments were introduced, 
and some congressmen went so far as to call for Earl Warren's 
impeachment(Malone 371). 
Amid this controversy, crime in the streets emerged as 
the number one domestic issue in the 1968 Presidential election. 
Ever the political opportunist Republican candidate Richard 
Nixon led the tirades on the Warren Court and their decision 
in Miranda. Nixon placed most of the blame for the increase 
in street crime on the Miranda majority. He claimed that their 
decision, "had the effect of seriously hamstringing the peace 
forces in our society and strengthening the criminal 
forces"(Baker 211). He believed that the dissenters in the 
high court, who had consistently been out voted by the more 
liberal 5-4 majority on civil rights issues, were justified 
in attacking the majority decision. From their stern dissent, 
Nixon formed his platform for a "war on crime." He promised 
to appoint justices to the court who would share his ideology 
of a strict construction to the constitution, and he launched 
an all out assault on the Warren Court. 
Nixon skillfully exploited the nation's ever-increasing 
fear of crime, promising an administration that would restore 
law and order in American society. This was a tactic not unknown 
to Nixon, as he had while a young congressman, exploited the 
fear of Communism to further his own political career. The 
strategy was the same, only Nixon's villain had changed 
When Nixon was elected to the Presidency in 1968, all of 
the cards for the undoing of Miranda had finally fallen into 
place. Nixon had promised in his campaign to appoint strict 
constructionist justices to the Supreme Court, who would oppose 
decisions such as Miranda. Once in office, that is precisely 
what he proceeded to do. Not only would the newly elected 
President be able to appoint four new justices to the court, 
but subsequent court decisions were to be handed down which 
would have a more narrow interpretation of the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants(Baker 217) ••• 
Nixon was to get his first chance for Supreme Court 
appointment with the resignation of Earl Warren. The~ 77 year 
old Chief Justice had submitted his resignation to former 
President Lyndon Johnson near the end of his term, in the hope 
that Johnson would be able to appoint his successor. However, 
political factors kept the lame duck President from appointing 
a new Chief Justice before he left office. When Nixon was 
elected, Chief Justice Warren agreed to stay on until the end 
of the 1968 term. However, Nixon would be able to appoint a 
.-
-
new Chief Justice by mid-summer 1969. 
Nixon's first choice for replacing the Chief Justice was 
judge Warren Burger of the u.s. Court of Appeals for the 
Washington D.C. Circuit. Burger was a strict law-and-order 
judge, confirming criminal convictions in 87 percent of the 
cases he heard(Baker 194). Burger was also very active on the 
lecture circuit, repeatedly attacking Miranda and similar 
decisions, as well as the Supreme Court itself. All of this 
caught the attention of Richard Nixon, who felt that Burger 
would be an ideal replacement for the Chief Justice. Burger's 
ideology of a "strict construction to the constitution" and 
his tough approach to crime gained him overwhelming Senate 
approval. He was to be sworn in on the last day of the Court's 
1968 term. 
Washington D.C. June 23, 1969. Exiting Chief Justice 
Earl Warren read the oath, and it was repeated by Judge Warren 
Burger. That moment marked the end of the Warren Court; the 
court which had been dedicated to preserving the rights of all 
people, rich and poor alike, eliminating racial injustice, 
promoting equality, and protecting the constitutional rights 
of all men and women for the past sixteen years. The man who 
had written the decision in Miranda was being replaced by the 
man who vehemently opposed it. Warren Burger was now Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. That moment marked 
the end of an era(Baker 287). The change that took place that 
day was a foreshadowing of the many changes which were to take 
place under the new Chief Justice. 
-. 
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When Burger was sworn in, there was an empty seat where 
Justice Abe Fortas would have sat. He had recently been the 
target of a public controversy which had ultimately led to his 
resignation. This meant that early in Nixon's administration, 
he would have the opportunity for a second appointment to the 
Supreme Court. 
The opening of the Court's 1969 term began with an air 
of uncertainty. No longer was there Earl Warren to preside. 
Abe Fortas's chair remained vacant. The Miranda majority had 
been substantially weakened, with only Justices Black, Brennan, 
and Douglas remaining. Thurgood Marshall, who had been appointed 
by President Johnson when Tom Clark (dissenter in Miranda) had 
resigned his seat, joined their camp, forming what was now a 
four man minority. 
After twice failing to gain congressional confirmation 
of appointees to fill former Justice Fortas's seat, President 
Nixon settled on another strict constructionist who would gain 
approval. The judge was Harry Blackmun, currently sitting on 
the u.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Blackmun 
was confirmed, and took the oath on June 9, 1970. Nixon had 
delivered on his promise; the Supreme Court was now composed 
of a majority which was in opposition to the mind set of the 
Warren Court and the Miranda majority. The new ideology of 
the "Burger Court" and subsequent decisions would begin to take 
the backbone out of the landmark Miranda decision(Baker 306). 
Since assuming the office of Chief Justice, Warren Burger 
consistently expressed his belief to his fellow justices that 
certain precedents set by the Warren Court should be overruled. 
Miranda v. Arizona was one of those decisions(Baker 311). The 
first such case came in September of 1969, involving Viven 
Harris, who was convicted of selling heroin to an undercover 
police officer. 
Harris's case involved a confessions issue, but in a 
different way than had Ernest Miranda's. Harris had given a 
statement to police officers without first receiving Miranda 
warnings, and the statement was used in trial to impeach his 
credibility. It was clear that the statement had been gained 
in violation of Miranda, and could not be used to gain 
conviction. However, the legal issue being raised was whether 
the statement could be used to impeach his credibility as a 
witness. This case was significant, because if the Court allowed 
illegally obtained evidence admissibility for any reason, it 
could open the door for the use of illegally obtained evidence 
in other situations 
In February, 1971 Chief Justice Burger handed down the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Harris v. New York, upholding the 
use of the statement and affirming the conviction. Burger 
reasoned that an otherwise inadmissible statement, if 
trustworthy, could be used to impeach a defendant's credibility 
at trial. Burger wrote in the majority decision, "The shield 
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use 
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation 
with prior inconsistent utterances"(Baker 317). 
The decision in Harris did not overrule Miranda, but 
allowing such evidence to be admissible in trial opened the 
door for further decisions which would chip away at earlier 
rulings handed down by the Warren Court. The Court had split 
5-4 in the decision, clearly illustrating the importance and 
significance of the two Nixon appointees. These appointees 
had joined the three remaining dissenters from Miranda, Justices 
Harlan, White, and stewart to form what was now a conservative 
majority. 
Eighty-five year old Justice Hugo Black decided he would 
be unable to return to his seat after the 1970 te~m, due to 
failing health. He died days after sending his letter of 
resignation to President Nixon. Black had been instrumental 
in the landmark civil rights decisions handed down by the Warren 
Court. His passing marked yet another opportunity for Nixon 
to fulfill his promise to pack the Supreme Court with strict 
constructionists to the constitution. 
Justice John Harlan also failed to return to his seat for 
the 1971 term. Harlan was also taken to illness, and eventually 
passed away a few months after Hugo Black. Throughout his tenure 
on the high court, Harlan had stood as a conservative, but his 
vacancy was certainly to be filled with another justice of 
similar ideology. 
Nixon was quick to fill the two empty seats, again with 
strict constructionists. His first choice was Lewis Powell, 
a prominent practicing lawyer from Virginia. His second 
appointee was William Rehnquist, who was at the time serving 
as the head of the Justice Department's Office of lawyer. Both 
appointees were easily confirmed, thus fulfilling Nixon's promise 
to pack the court with conservatives. Only Justices Douglas 
and Brennan of the Miranda majority remained. Nixon had made 
four new appointments to the Supreme Court, all of whom shared 
his ideology and his disagreement with the three decades of 
Warren Court decisions(Baker 324). Those decisions, especially 
Miranda, seemed doomed to reversal ••• 
In 1974, another case came before the Court which had the 
possibility of further undoing Miranda. The case, Michigan 
v. Tucker, involved a conviction gained in an interrogation 
in which complete Miranda warnings had not been given. Tucker 
was told by police of his right to remain silent and of his 
right to counsel. However, he was not told that he would be 
provided with a lawyer if he could not afford one. His 
statements were excluded at trial, but the statements of a 
witness whom Tucker had identified in his interrogation were 
admitted. 
The issue raised in this case was whether evidence obtained 
as a result of illegally obtained evidence (as the fruit of 
ill-gotten evidence) must be excluded as well. However, the 
Court dodged this issue, and instead attempted to redefine the 
Miranda ruling. They conceded that the complete Miranda 
requirements had been disregarded, but that they had been done 
so inadvertantly. Police in this case, they reasoned, had acted 
in good faith, thus making an exception to the exclusionary 
rule. The majority opinion believed that the disregard of 
Miranda rulings on the behalf of the police had no actual effect 
on Tucker's trial. Justice Rehnquist wrote in the majority 
opinion, "The law does not require that a defendant receive 
a perfect trial, only a fair one"(Baker 350). 
Michigan v. Tucker clearly demonstrated the conservative 
thinking which had become a dominant majority on the United 
states Supreme Court. The shrinking liberal minority was dealt 
yet another blow with the retirement of the senior associate 
justice, William Douglas, in November, 1975. Douglas had been 
partially paralyzed in a stroke he had suffered a year before, 
and his health had since been steadily deteriorating. After 
thirty-six years on the nation's highest court, Douglas's failing 
health had forced him to forward his letter of retirement to 
the President. 
However, the man who had been responsible for packing the 
court with conservatives would not have another opportunity 
for appointment. Richard Nixon was no longer President. He 
had resigned in August, 1974 amid a public scandal which had 
become known as Watergate. Gerald Ford, whom Nixon had appointed 
to be Vice President with the resignation of Spiro Agnew, became 
President when Nixon resigned. 
Douglas's retirement left Justice Brennan as the only 
remaining justice who was in the Miranda majority. President 
Ford's first selection to fill Douglas's seat was John Stevens, 
a judge for the U.S. Court of appeals for the seventh circuit. 
Stevens was easily confirmed by the Senate, and was sworn in 
less than one month later. Stevens was indeed a conservative, 
but whether he would fit the mold of the Nixon-appointed strict 
constructionists still remained to be seen(Baker 388). 
December 15, 1975. The Supreme Court of the United states 
granted certiorari in the case of Brewer v. Williams. This 
was an extremely critical case involving the confessions issue 
and custodial interrogation. In fact, the attorney general 
of Iowa was specifically asking the Supreme Court to overrule 
Miranda in this case, and it seemed certain, considering the 
current make-up of the court, that it would. 
The case involved an escaped mental patient named Robert 
Williams, who had allegedly kidnaped a ten year old girl, killed 
her, and buried the body. A young boy had seen Williams loading 
a bundle into his car, which was found the next day 160 miles 
away. A warrant was issued for his arrest, and Williams 
eventually surrendered to police. He was then driven back the 
160 miles to Des Moines where the crime had occurred. 
Williams had been given the proper Miranda warnings, and 
had decided not to make any statements until he got back to 
Des Moines and could talk to a lawyer. However, during the 
ride, police detective Captain Cleatus Learning gave to Williams 
what has become known as the "Christian burial speech." He 
told Williams that he felt he was the only one who knew where 
the girl's body was, and that the girl's family should be 
entitled to a proper Christain burial. With a snowstorm 
predicted for that night, Captain Learning expressed his concern 
to Williams that it would be impossible for anyone t:o find the 
body the next morning. In consideration of the speech, Williams 
-directed police to the body, as well as making incriminating 
statements(Baker 391). He was later foud guilty on the basis 
of that confession. 
Counsel for Williams, Robert Bartells, knowing the 
disposition of the court, wanted to avoid arguing the case on 
Miranda grounds. He instead addressed it as a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel issue. Bartells claimed that Williams had 
been denied his right to counsel during the return trip to Des 
Moines, when the incriminating statements were made. 
Surprisingly, when the decision was handed down in March, 
1975, the Supreme Court had also addressed the case as a Sixth 
Amendment issue. The majority opinion reasoned that Learning 
had been overzealous in his handling of the case. The 
confession, given while in the isolation of the police car, 
was ruled to be inadmissible at trial. It was the opinion of 
the majority that the detectives had deliberately sought to 
take the opportunity to elicit incriminating evidence from 
Williams, despite his desire to speak to an attorney before 
making any statements(Baker 393). His conviction was remanded 
to the Iowa state court and a new trial was ordered. 
Although Brewer v. Williams seemed to be the ideal avenue 
for overturning Miranda, marking the high point of efforts to 
overturn the landmark decision, it too had failed. The 5-4 
decision clearly demonstrated that despite what some ambitious 
politicians might have hoped, the ultimate loyalty of the 
justices was to the constitution and the law of the land. 
Miranda had endured attacks from every segment of American life, 
__ surviving as a symbol of the constitutional rights of all men 
. -
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and women. The decision had never lived up to the fears of 
escalating crime rates and criminals walking free because of 
technicalities; nor had the decision significantly reduced the 
number of confessions that police were able to obtain, as others 
had feared. In reality, Miranda warnings have had very little 
effect on the likelihood that a suspect will talk; most routinely 
waive their rights. In fact, next to the warning label on 
cigarette packs, Miranda is the most largely ignored official 
advice in society(Malone 368). Miranda had become an accepted 
part of the popular culture, serving as a constant reminder 
of man's equality and civil rights. Miranda the man was not 
as fortunate ••• 
The Supreme Court's decision did not free Ernest Miranda, 
it only gave him a new trial. He was tried and convicted again. 
On March 1, 1967, one year to the day after his case was being 
argued before the Supreme Court, Ernest Miranda was again 
sentenced to twenty to thirty years in the Arizona State Prison. 
Ernest Miranda was paroled in 1971, but his freedom was 
to be short-lived. In July, 1974, Miranda was pulled over in 
downtown Tempe for driving on the wrong side of the road. He 
was arrested for driving on a suspended license, and the ensuing 
search revealed amphetamines and a loaded .38 caliber revolver. 
Possession of the gun and the amphetamines were both in violation 
of his parole, and he was sent back to the Arizona State Prison 
where he would serve for two more years. 
Phoenix, Arizona. January 31, 1976. A drunken fight broke 
over a poker game in a downtown bar, in which Ernest Miranda, 
appliance store deliveryman, was stabbed by one of the illegal 
Mexican immigrants he was playing poker with. He was pronounced 
dead on arrival at the Good Samaritan Hospital(Baker 408). 
The killer fled, but Phoenix police were able to catch his 
accomplice. Before questioning him, two officers read to him 
from a card, one in English, one in Spanish: 
You have the right to remain silent. 
Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law. 
You have the right to the presence of an attorney to assist 
you prior to questioning and to be with you during questioning 
if you so desire. 
If you cannot afford an attorney you have the right to have 
an attorney appointed to you prior to questioning. 
Do you understand these rights? 
Will you voluntarily answer my questions? 
--
-
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